Opinions of Wednesday, 10 September 2025

Columnist: Dr Isaac Yaw Asiedu

Do regular government changes help or hurt Africa's economic progress?

Africa's 8-year democratic cycles impact economic stability Africa's 8-year democratic cycles impact economic stability

Introduction: The democracy–development puzzle

Africa today faces a paradox. On one hand, most African countries have embraced multiparty democracy, with constitutions that limit presidential terms to 8 years (two 4-year terms, or sometimes two 5-year terms). On the other hand, the continent still struggles with persistent debt crises, unemployment, and slow industrialization.

This raises a tough question: Does changing governments every 8 years help or hurt Africa’s long-term economic recovery? For young people struggling to find jobs, and for citizens worried about repeated IMF bailouts, the answer is not obvious.

The promise of democratic turnover

1. Accountability and Legitimacy

Regular elections allow citizens to punish underperforming leaders. This should, in theory, reduce corruption and make governments more responsive to the people.

2. Policy Correction

If a government adopts destructive policies, the next government can reverse course peacefully. This is far better than decades of one-party or military rule, which often lock countries into economic mismanagement.

3. Peaceful Transfer vs. Coups

Frequent elections reduce the risk of violent coups, which have historically been devastating to African economies. Political stability is a precondition for investment and growth.

The Short-Cycle Problem

Despite these promises, democratic cycles in Africa often create economic short-termism:

1. Election-cycle economics: Governments ramp up spending, borrow heavily, and launch prestige projects to win votes. After elections, the economy is burdened with unsustainable debt.

2. Policy discontinuity: Incoming governments often abandon or reverse their predecessor’s projects — not because they are bad, but because they belong to the “wrong party.” This wastes money and undermines investor confidence.

3. Debt temptation: Because each administration has only 8 years, the incentive is to borrow and spend quickly, leaving repayment to the next government.

4. Institutional weakness: Where independent bodies (fiscal councils, central banks, parliaments) are weak, policy is tied to the personalities in office, not to a national vision.

Case Study 1: Botswana – Continuity Through Consensus

Botswana offers one of Africa’s clearest examples of democracy supporting long-term development. Since independence in 1966, every president has respected term limits. Yet economic policies — especially prudent management of diamond revenues — have remained consistent.

Why?

a. Botswana created a cross-party consensus that diamond revenues must be saved and invested, not squandered.

b. Institutions like the Pula Fund (sovereign wealth fund) were insulated from politics.

c. As governments changed, the broad direction — fiscal discipline, education investment, and infrastructure building — remained steady. Result: Botswana avoided the “resource curse,” maintained one of Africa’s highest credit ratings, and expanded social services while growing steadily.

Case Study 2: Mauritius – Democracy Anchoring Transformation

Mauritius has had frequent government changes since its independence in 1968. Yet rather than derailing development, elections have strengthened it.

Why?

a. Successive governments respected a national economic diversification strategy: moving from sugar to textiles, then to tourism, then to finance and ICT.

b. Independent institutions — judiciary, central bank, investment agencies — outlasted electoral cycles.

c. Voters expected continuity in good policies and punished reckless populism. Result: Mauritius transitioned from a poor monocrop economy to a diversified, middle-income country with one of Africa’s strongest democracies.

Case Study 3: Ghana – The election cycle trap

Ghana is often hailed as a model of democracy in Africa. Since 1992, it has seen peaceful transfers of power between the two dominant parties (NPP and NDC). But democracy has not translated into stable economic progress.

Problems:

a. Election spending: Both parties increase spending and borrowing in election years, fueling inflation and debt.

b. Policy reversals: Programs such as Free SHS or industrialisation plans are either politicised or inconsistently implemented.

c. IMF dependency: Ghana has gone to the IMF 18 times since independence — partly because every election cycle leaves the economy fragile. Result: Ghana’s democratic vibrancy coexists with chronic economic instability. Democracy has preserved peace, but has not yet anchored long-term recovery.

Case Study 4: Zambia – debt and discontinuity

Zambia highlights the danger of election-driven borrowing. Successive governments borrowed heavily to finance infrastructure and subsidies, especially around elections. When copper prices fell, Zambia defaulted in 2020.

Problems:

a. Policies shifted dramatically with changes in government, undermining investor confidence.

b. Prestige projects were prioritised over long-term reforms.

c. Weak institutions allowed short-term politics to drive debt accumulation. Result: Despite democratic progress, Zambia became one of the first African countries to default in the COVID-19 era, and is now under an IMF program.

Lessons for Africa

1. Democracy itself is not the problem.

Countries like Botswana and Mauritius show that regular elections can support long-term growth — if institutions are strong and national visions survive party turnover.

2. Weak institutions make 8-year cycles destructive.

In countries like Ghana and Zambia, politics override policy. Each government starts from scratch, spending recklessly and abandoning useful projects.

3. Continuity matters more than personalities.

Economic recovery takes decades, not election cycles. If good policies cannot survive beyond one administration, debt traps will repeat.

The Way Forward: Making democracy work for development

1. National development compacts: Parties should sign on to shared long-term priorities (industrialisation, debt discipline, education) that survive elections.

2. Independent institutions: Fiscal councils, central banks, and anti-corruption bodies must be shielded from political interference.

3. Citizen demands: Voters must demand continuity of good reforms, not just short-term giveaways. Civil society and media should hold governments to account.

4. Regional anchors: African Union’s Agenda 2063 and AfCFTA can act as external anchors to keep countries on track regardless of election cycles.

5. Youth engagement: Africa’s young population must push for leaders who invest in long-term opportunities, not quick electoral gimmicks.

Conclusion: Elections as course-correction, not reset

Changing governments every 8 years can either be a curse or a blessing. When institutions are weak, elections feel like a “reset button,” wiping out continuity and worsening debt traps. But when institutions are strong and national visions survive beyond parties, elections become a “course-correction mechanism,” refining policies while keeping the country on a steady path.

The challenge for Africa is not whether democracy is compatible with development, but whether African democracies can build institutions and shared visions that survive political turnover. If they can, democracy will be the continent’s greatest asset for long-term economic recovery.