Since independence in 1957, Ghana’s political journey has been punctuated by a recurring cycle. Opposition parties and leaders rise to prominence by accusing incumbents of corruption and incompetence, promising reforms and accountability, only to be accused of the same once they assume power. This cycle has not only undermined trust in successive governments but has also deepened public cynicism, leading to the widespread refrain: “all politicians are the same.”
From the visionary era of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, through the tumultuous military and civilian transitions, to the democratic governments of the Fourth Republic, corruption has remained both a political weapon and a governance challenge.
Under the current President Mahama-led NDC administration, a section of the Ghanaian public have started expressing their disappointments at the seemingly slow-paced prosecution of persons who have been alleged to be deeply involved in corruption under the immediate past administration.
But, are these people wrong in expressing their disappointment just eight months into the new administration?
I strongly hold the view that they were invited to do so. From the work of ORAL to the press engagements by the Attorney-General, the ordinary Ghanaian carry in their mind the picture of a prison sentence for those suspects. History, they say, is the best teacher.
As Ghana’s first leader, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah embodied the dreams of independence. His Convention People’s Party (CPP) embarked on massive projects like the Akosombo Dam, Tema Township, and the Seven-Year Development Plan, to industrialize and modernize Ghana.
Yet, by the mid-1960s, opposition voices accused Nkrumah’s government of mismanaging state funds, using public resources for patronage, and enriching party loyalists. The Preventive Detention Act (1958), which allowed the imprisonment of opponents without trial, was seen as a tool to shield allies and suppress critics.
By 1966, widespread perceptions of corruption and authoritarianism helped justify the military coup that overthrew Nkrumah. The National Liberation Council (NLC) presented itself as rescuing Ghana from “corrupt dictatorship.” Thus began the cycle: corruption allegations as justification for regime change.
After a period of military rule, Dr. Kofi Abrefa Busia’s Progress Party (PP) won power in 1969, promising democracy and accountability. However, corruption accusations soon marred his tenure.
The “Apollo 568” retrenchment exercise, which dismissed hundreds of civil servants, was viewed as politically motivated. The opposition alleged nepotism in government contracts and favoritism in public appointments.
By 1972, economic hardship and claims of corruption had eroded Busia’s legitimacy, enabling Col. Ignatius Kutu Acheampong’s coup, which again justified itself as a war against corruption.
Acheampong’s National Redemption Council (later Supreme Military Council) initially presented itself as a corrective regime. With slogans like “Yen tua” (we won’t pay the foreign debt), it promised economic sovereignty and discipline.
Yet, by the mid-1970s, Ghana’s economy had deteriorated, and the term “kalabule” entered the national vocabulary, denoting black-market profiteering, hoarding, and corruption that pervaded both state institutions and daily life.
Opposition voices, including students and professional associations, condemned Acheampong’s regime as corrupt and illegitimate. By 1978, internal dissent forced his removal, but corruption narratives continued under his successor, Lt. Gen. Frederick Akuffo, setting the stage for a radical intervention.
Following the June 4th, 1979 uprising led by Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings, senior military officers were executed for corruption in a dramatic “house-cleaning exercise.” The message was clear: Ghana would not tolerate corrupt leadership.
When Dr. Hilla Limann’s People’s National Party (PNP) assumed power later that year, expectations were high for transparent governance. Yet, within two years, Limann’s government was accused of weakness and corruption. Rawlings and his allies branded the PNP as incapable of safeguarding the revolutionary ideals.
On December 31, 1981, Rawlings staged another coup, justifying it on the grounds of corruption and national decay.

Rawlings’ Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) promised a revolution based on “probity and accountability.” Public tribunals, confiscation of ill-gotten assets, and populist campaigns gave his regime legitimacy.
However, as the PNDC evolved and transitioned into the National Democratic Congress (NDC) under constitutional rule in 1992, the anticorruption zeal waned. Opposition forces accused the Rawlings government of favoritism, misuse of state resources, and suppressing critics.
By the late 1990s, the opposition NPP campaigned heavily on the message that the Rawlings era had institutionalized corruption. This perception, coupled with a desire for change, paved the way for the NPP’s victory in 2000.

President John Agyekum Kufuor began his tenure with the slogan “zero tolerance for corruption.” The creation of institutions such as the Public Procurement Authority signaled a commitment to accountability.
But scandals soon eroded this image. The Hotel Kufuor saga, involving the President’s son’s purchase of a hotel, raised questions about conflict of interest. The Ghana@50 celebrations were also criticized for financial impropriety.
The opposition NDC weaponized these cases, claiming the NPP had betrayed its anticorruption promise. By 2008, the corruption narrative played a role in the NPP losing power.
Prof. John Evans Atta Mills, widely respected for his personal integrity, pledged to fight corruption quietly but firmly. His government revisited contracts signed under Kufuor, but his administration was soon consumed by the Woyome Judgment Debt scandal, in which businessman Alfred Woyome was said to be wrongfully paid over GHS 51 million.
Though Mills himself was seen as clean, critics argued that he failed to control corruption among his appointees. The opposition NPP seized on this scandal as evidence of systemic rot under the NDC.

When John Dramani Mahama assumed power after Mills’ death, he faced mounting challenges. His government became associated with multiple corruption controversies, including the GYEEDA scandal, the SADA scandal and the continued controversy over the Woyome case.
The opposition NPP relentlessly used these scandals to brand Mahama’s NDC as the “most corrupt government in Ghana’s history.” Combined with economic hardships, this perception led to Mahama’s defeat in the 2016 elections.

The NPP under Nana Akufo-Addo returned to power on the promise of “protecting the public purse.” The establishment of the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) was hailed as a landmark reform.
But soon, his government was engulfed in controversies: The Agyapa Royalties deal, alleged irregularities in COVID-19 expenditure, the controversial financing of the National Cathedral, and the resignation of Martin Amidu as OSP, citing government interference.

By 2024, public frustration was palpable, and the NDC capitalized on these scandals to mount its comeback. In January 2025, John Dramani Mahama returned to power with a renewed promise to tackle corruption. Even before his swearing-in, he launched Operation Recover All Loot (ORAL), chaired by Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa, with members including Daniel Domelevo, COP Nathaniel Kofi Boakye (rtd), Martin Kpebu, and Raymond Archer.
ORAL received over 2,400 complaints of alleged corruption under the previous administration. The Attorney General, Dr. Dominic Ayine, held press briefings to update citizens, naming individuals like Kwabena Adu Boahene, and reviving cases such as the Ken Ofori-Atta National Cathedral scandal.
While many Ghanaians welcomed this bold step, critics warned against “trial by media” and cautioned that acquittals could deepen public cynicism. Once again, expectations are sky-high, and failure to secure convictions risks reinforcing the old perception: “they are all corrupt.”

From Nkrumah’s CPP to Mahama’s 2025 NDC, Ghana’s politics has been shaped by the weaponization of corruption. Every regime has risen on promises of accountability, only to fall under the same allegations it once used.
But, what is unique about President Mahama that can convince the Ghanaian that unlike the past, he will undoubtedly break this cycle?
I am of the firm belief that to break this cycle, there is the need for government to demonstrate its commitments in the following:
Government must encourage independent anticorruption institutions free from partisan interference.
2. There must be a transparent judicial processes that ensure speedy and fair trials.
3. There must be conscious effort to promote and encourage civic education to distinguish allegations from convictions.
4. The Attorney-General and political party communicators must be cautious in churning out allegations and “evidence” against political opponents.
5. We must demonstrate consistent political will that goes beyond electoral rhetoric.

Until these measures are realized, corruption will remain both a political tool and a national curse, thereby feeding voter disillusionment and weakening faith in Ghana’s democracy.
President John Dramani Mahama, with a rich political experience, having climbed the political ladder from the grassroots to the highest political office is presented with the unique opportunity to make history. Will he make good use of this opportunity or he will fail us? Will his reset agenda result in a new direction of governance where we would never have to repeat this cycle? Only time will tell.
The writer, D. Deladem Kisseih is a Journalist with passion for Africa’s transformation.
Email: dannycentralpress@gmail.com
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