As Moscow deepens its security partnerships across the continent, opaque mining arrangements and the record of Wagner-linked operations raise questions about who ultimately benefits from Africa’s mineral wealth.

Africa’s gold, diamonds and other natural resources are increasingly central to a Russian security strategy that, in several countries, has combined military assistance with commercial interests.

The arrangement offers governments support against armed groups and political threats. Still, investigations into Russian-linked networks raise a more troubling question: could the price of security be the loss of control over resources that should finance Africa’s development?

The concern is not simply that Russian companies are mining in Africa. Foreign investment can create jobs, generate tax revenue and provide capital for development.

The problem arises when military assistance, privileged access to political leaders and opaque commercial arrangements converge, making it difficult to establish who receives the proceeds from resource extraction and what the host country gains in return.

The Wagner Group became the most prominent expression of this model. Originally operating as a nominally private military company with close links to the Kremlin, Wagner deployed personnel to countries including the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, Libya and Mali.

Its operations frequently combined security support with business interests in countries where state institutions and regulatory oversight were weak.

Following the death of Wagner founder Yevgeny Prigozhin in 2023, Moscow moved to bring much of its African security activity under more direct state control through the Africa Corps and associated networks.

The change in structure has not removed the questions surrounding the commercial and political relationships established during Wagner’s expansion. A Congressional Research Service report updated in April 2026 describes Russia’s African security operations as a model in which military support is offered in exchange for payment or access to natural resources. It also identifies the Central African Republic, Libya and Mali as countries with substantial Russian security deployments.

Gold and the cost of protection

The Central African Republic offers one of the clearest examples of the overlap between security operations and resource extraction. Wagner-linked companies, including Midas Ressources and Diamville, have been associated with gold and diamond interests in the country.

In June 2023, the United States Treasury Department sanctioned several companies and individuals connected to Wagner, alleging that illicit gold dealings helped finance the group’s operations.

The Treasury said Midas Ressources held preferential mining rights at the Ndassima gold mine, which experts cited by the department estimated contained gold worth more than US$1 billion. It also alleged that Midas and Wagner had prevented Central African government officials from inspecting the mine.

In March 2024, the Treasury imposed further sanctions on companies it said had facilitated Wagner’s activities and illicit natural-resource extraction in the country.

These are US government findings and sanctions designations, rather than judicial determinations of every allegation. Nevertheless, they identify specific companies, commercial relationships and regulatory concerns that African governments cannot afford to ignore.

The economic question is straightforward. When a foreign-linked company receives preferential access to a valuable mineral deposit, can the host government independently verify production, exports, royalties and taxes? And if security assistance forms part of the same relationship, can the government enforce its mining laws without jeopardising that assistance? Where the answers are unclear, a country risks surrendering both revenue and regulatory control.

Sudan and the conflict economy

Sudan presents a different but related set of concerns. Russian-linked commercial networks have been scrutinised for their involvement in gold trading, including through companies associated with Wagner.

The significance extends beyond mining revenue. In a country devastated by war since April 2023, control over gold production and trading can influence the resources available to armed and politically connected actors.

The wider Sudanese gold economy involves multiple networks, including domestic armed groups and international trading intermediaries. It would therefore be misleading to attribute the country’s conflict financing to Russia alone.

However, investigations into Wagner-linked companies have highlighted the potential for gold transactions to provide revenue and financial

channels for Russian interests while operating in environments where public oversight is severely weakened.

For African governments, the lesson is that mineral extraction cannot be separated from the systems through which revenue is collected, transferred and spent. Even a commercially productive mine may deliver limited public benefit if its output and financial flows cannot be independently verified.

Mali exposes the limits of the model

The assumption that security assistance will reliably produce commercial gains is not borne out in every case. Mali invited Wagner personnel into the country after military coups and deteriorating relations with Western security partners.

The group deployed alongside Malian forces to fight insurgents, while Russia’s wider engagement strengthened its relationship with the military government. Yet an August 2025 investigation by The Sentry found that Wagner had failed to achieve significant battlefield successes or gain access to Mali’s lucrative gold-mining sector. It also documented allegations of massacres, looting, civilian abuses and operational failures.

Wagner announced its withdrawal in June 2025, with the Africa Corps continuing Russia’s security presence. The Sentry argued that the deployment had worsened insecurity in some areas, contributed to political tensions and imposed substantial costs without delivering the promised results.

Russia’s security-for-resources model should not be treated as a uniform arrangement in which Moscow automatically secures mineral concessions wherever its forces deploy.

African governments retain agency, and some have resisted giving foreign security partners control over strategic assets. But Mali also demonstrates the risks of measuring a security partnership by the survival of a government or the delivery of military equipment rather than improvements in public safety, institutional capacity and economic welfare.

What Africa should demand

The issue is not whether African countries should accept Russian investment or security cooperation. It is whether such relationships are negotiated on terms that protect the public interest.

First, governments should publish major mining and security agreements, subject to legitimate national-security restrictions, and disclose the beneficial owners of companies receiving valuable concessions.

Second, independent regulators must retain access to mining sites, production records and export data. Royalties, taxes and other payments should be reconciled against verified output, with audits available to the appropriate oversight institutions.

Third, security assistance should not exempt foreign personnel or associated companies from national law. Allegations of civilian abuses, unlawful extraction or corruption should trigger credible investigations, regardless of the nationality of those involved.

Finally, African governments should assess the full economic cost of security partnerships. The relevant calculation must include direct payments, the value of concessions, tax exemptions, contingent liabilities and the opportunity cost of resources that might otherwise finance public services.

These standards should apply equally to Russian, Chinese, Western and African companies. The objective is not to replace one foreign partner with another, but to ensure that every partner operates under enforceable rules.

As Russia deepens its engagement across Africa, the test will be whether its partnerships generate measurable improvements in security, investment and public revenue. A deal that protects a government while weakening the public finances or leaving civilians exposed to abuse cannot be judged successful merely because it delivers military support.

Africa’s mineral wealth should finance its development, not become an opaque means of paying for political protection. Before governments sign new agreements, they should establish precisely what is being exchanged, who benefits and how the public can hold all parties accountable.