Same global energy shock, sharply different domestic fuel price pass-through.

Tracking credible data from the National Petroleum Authority’s (NPA) price floor series from the pre-war period in February 2026 to the second September pricing window, Ghana’s petrol price floor rose from GH¢10.24 to GH¢16.00 per litre, an increase of GH¢5.76, or 56.3%. Diesel rose from GH¢11.34 to GH¢16.77 per litre, representing an increase of GH¢5.43, or 47.9%.

The reality, however, is markedly different across Ghana’s West African Francophone counterparts. The West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) is a regional economic and monetary union comprising eight countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. Seven of these countries are Francophone, while Guinea-Bissau is Portuguese-speaking. The eight countries share a common monetary framework under the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO).

Between February and September 2026, Benin’s petrol price increased from CFAF695 to CFAF725 per litre, representing a 4.3% increase, while diesel rose from CFAF720 to CFAF750, or 4.2%.

In Burkina Faso, petrol remained unchanged at CFAF850 per litre, while diesel increased from CFAF675 to CFAF750, representing an 11.1% increase.

In Côte d’Ivoire, petrol rose from CFAF820 to CFAF905 per litre, an increase of 10.4%, while diesel increased from CFAF675 to CFAF850, or 25.9%.

Guinea-Bissau recorded an 18.3% increase in petrol, from CFAF760 to CFAF899, while diesel rose from CFAF766 to CFAF898, representing a 17.2% increase.

In Mali, petrol increased from CFAF775 to CFAF875 per litre, or 12.9%, while diesel rose from CFAF725 to CFAF940, representing a 29.7% increase.

In Niger, both petrol and diesel prices remained unchanged at CFAF499 and CFAF618 per litre, respectively.

In Senegal, petrol increased from CFAF920 to CFAF990 per litre, or 7.6%, while diesel rose from CFAF680 to CFAF755, representing an 11.0% increase.

In Togo, petrol increased from CFAF680 to CFAF817, or 20.1%, while diesel rose from CFAF695 to CFAF766, representing a 10.2% increase.

Across the eight WAEMU countries, the simple average increase was 9.2% for petrol and 13.7% for diesel.

Ghana’s 56.3% petrol price increase was therefore approximately 512% higher than the WAEMU average, while the 47.9% increase in diesel was approximately 250% higher.

The contrast is particularly striking in Burkina Faso. Petrol prices recorded no increase during the period, despite the country producing no crude oil and relying on imported petroleum products. The IMF notes that Burkina Faso’s dependence on imported petroleum products exposes the country to international energy price shocks. Yet its domestic pricing arrangements have shielded consumers from the full extent of the shock.

Niger presents an even stronger example. The IMF reports that administered fuel prices have not been revised since October 2024. Stability at the pump does not mean that Niger has escaped the global energy shock. Rather, part of the shock has been absorbed through government intervention.

The IMF estimates Niger’s combined explicit and implicit fuel subsidy at 0.6% of GDP in 2026, comprising 0.3% of GDP in each category.

This brings the issue beyond the price of crude oil itself. It becomes a question of policy: when an international energy shock arrives, how much of it should the consumer absorb immediately, and how much should the state cushion?

The WAEMU experience shows that global oil price shocks do not necessarily have to translate into the same magnitude of increases at the pump. The IMF notes that limited price pass-through in some WAEMU countries has been supported by regulated petroleum prices and long-term pre-purchased fixed-price oil contracts.

Burkina Faso has also used energy subsidies to cushion consumers, although such subsidies carry fiscal costs.

There is also an important difference in monetary architecture. Ghana operates its own monetary system under the Bank of Ghana, whereas the eight WAEMU countries share the BCEAO, a common central bank responsible for common monetary policy and the monetary framework of the union.

The difference in fuel price movements, however, cannot be attributed to the BCEAO alone. Pricing regulations, subsidies, taxation, import arrangements, exchange rate conditions and the extent of price pass-through all matter.

The broader lesson is straightforward: the global energy shock may be common, but the way governments transmit that shock to households is not.

When energy prices rise sharply, the policy choice determines how much of the burden is carried by consumers, businesses and the state.

The central question is therefore simple: when the price of energy rises sharply, who takes the hit?