The prosecution of former National Signals Bureau Director-General Kwabena Adu-Boahene has captured national attention because of the sheer scale of the allegations.

The prosecution alleges that about GH¢49.1 million equivalent $7million meant for a cyber-defence procurement project was diverted into private accounts linked to Adu-Boahene and his associates.

Yet despite the seriousness of the charges and the intense media blitz surrounding the case, there are growing legal and procedural signs that Adu-Boahene could ultimately walk free.

That possibility is not because corruption allegations are weak in principle, nor because the judicial system lacks interest in accountability. Rather, it reflects a basic reality of criminal law.

Media hype is not evidence, and suspicion is not proof beyond reasonable doubt.

The state may have a politically explosive case, but winning in court is a different matter entirely as the court deals with material evidence, facts and a coherent story.

THE BURDEN & STANDARD OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL TRIAL

The burden of proof in a criminal trial rests primarily on the prosecution. The prosecution is required to prove the guilt of the accused person beyond reasonable doubt. The standard of proof required in criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt.

This does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt, but the evidence must be so strong that no reasonable uncertainty remains regarding the guilt of the accused.

Legally, an accused person bears no duty to prove his innocence.

In many common law jurisdictions including Ghana, the presumption of innocence is constitutionally guaranteed. (Article 19(2) of 1992 constitution of Ghana)

In Woolmington v DPP, which is the leading authority on burden of proof in criminal law. The House of Lords held that throughout the web of English criminal law, the prosecution bears the burden of proving the accused’s guilt, subject only to limited exceptions.

Lord Sankey famously stated: “It is the duty of the prosecution to prove the accused’s guilt.”

Similarily, in the case of Miller v Minister of Pensions Lord Denning explained the meaning of proof beyond reasonable doubt. He stated that proof must carry a high degree of probability, though not beyond the shadow of doubt.

The burden of proof in criminal matters rests squarely on the prosecution and never shifts except where specifically provided by statute. See the case of Bakare V The State.

WHY THE STATE MAY NOT SECURE A CONVICTION AGAINST ADU BOAHENE & ORS

One of the biggest challenges facing the prosecution is the nature of national security operations themselves. They are opaque, secretive and highly classified with no or poor documentation.

Another major issue is criminal intent. The state must prove not only that money moved through “suspicious accounts”, but that Adu-Boahene intentionally and dishonestly stole state funds for personal benefit.

If the defence can show the transactions were operational, authorised, or part of classified activities, conviction becomes much harder.

Several developments during cross-examination have exposed inconsistencies and contradictions in the prosecution’s case that could significantly benefit Kwabena Adu-Boahene’s defence.

One of the biggest contradictions came from the prosecution’s own key witness, Edith Ruby Opokua Adumuah, the Head of Finance at the National Signals Bureau (NSB).

While the Attorney-General publicly framed the GH¢49.1 million as stolen funds disguised as payment for a cyber-defence system, the witness reportedly testified in court that the payments were “genuine special operations transactions” which she personally authorised after delivery and acceptance procedures were completed.

That testimony directly weakens the prosecution’s earlier public narrative that the transaction itself was inherently fraudulent.

Another major inconsistency concerns the alleged “missing” GH¢49.1 million. Under cross-examination, the same prosecution witness who is the custodian of National security funds admitted she was not aware of any theft or missing funds within the National Security apparatus.

She further stated that she had never reported any such loss to the Auditor-General, EOCO, the police, or her superiors, despite being the Head of Finance whose duty would ordinarily include flagging financial irregularities.

This creates a serious evidentiary problem for the prosecution because it suggests that internally, the transactions may not have been treated as theft at all.

The prosecution also appears to face difficulties regarding the nature of the disputed accounts. Defence lawyers have established through cross examination that certain accounts described publicly and in court as “personal accounts” were in fact operational National Security accounts used for special operations. Whereas accounts described as State accounts were actually accounts belonging to the National Security Cordinator.

During testimony, the finance head reportedly acknowledged that the National Security Coordinator had authority to open special-purpose accounts and designate signatories.

She also testified that, she personally transacted on the account several times. She told the court that, she personally paid two of the three disputed cheques into the said account and also withdrew several sums of money from the account.

If accepted by the court, this could undermine the prosecution’s attempt to portray the movement of funds as automatically suspicious simply because the accounts were unconventional.

Another inconsistency emerged regarding the prosecution’s dollar equivalence claim. The Attorney-General had publicly linked GH¢49.1 million to a supposed $7 million cyber-defence acquisition.

However, the prosecution witness reportedly admitted that at the relevant 2020 exchange rates, GH¢49.1 million was not equivalent to exactly $7 million.

While this may appear technical, it matters because corruption prosecutions depend heavily on precise financial tracing. Any discrepancy in the prosecution’s core figures can create reasonable doubt.

The witness testimony also reportedly confirmed that operational cash movements involving large sums — even money transported in “Ghana Must Go” bags — were routine within National Security operations.

She allegedly stated that such cash handling practices did not automatically imply theft or diversion.

That testimony is important because the prosecution has relied heavily on the optics of large cash withdrawals and transfers to imply wrongdoing. The defence can now argue that these practices were standard operational procedures within the intelligence structure.

Further inconsistencies emerged when the court admitted WhatsApp messages between Adu-Boahene and the prosecution witness into evidence.

According to reports, the witness conceded that some withdrawals and transfers were linked to operational requests, logistics, and field expenses connected to national security work.

This raises the argument that the prosecution selectively interpreted financial transactions while ignoring communications suggesting official operational purposes.

There is also tension within the witness testimony regarding internal controls. In one statement, the finance director reportedly explained that all cheque payments followed structured approval procedures involving recipient units, heads of administration, internal audit certification, and authorisation processes.

The witness also indicated that Adu Boahene could not have unilaterally transferred funds from the Cordinator’s Account to his personal accounts.
That evidence potentially undermines any prosecution narrative suggesting Adu-Boahene acted entirely alone or outside institutional oversight.

Also, contrary to the Attorney General’s case that, the cyber defense system was never bought and delivered, the head of finance testified to the court that, she personally paid for the defence system upon receipt by the National Security and added that, it is only the vendor (ISC Holdings of Israel) and the top hierarchy of the National Security that will be able to determine whether or not the equipment is in the possession of National security.

Another aspect of the witness’s testimony, that has raised more questions than answers touches on the nuture of the GHc49.1m; as to whether the money was sourced from public funds at all.

She testified that all monies released by the government to the National Security, were processed through the Ghana Integrated Financial Management Information System (GIFMIS); and that those monies were released to the state accounts of the National Security at the bank of Ghana.

She added that, the Coordinator’s special purpose accounts at the Fidelity Bank, which was also a receptacle of funds from private sources, never received any public funds processed through the GIFMIS system.

She further depeened the woes of the Prosecution that, the purported GHc49.1 million was never part of the budget she prepared for the year 2020, and never formed part of monies released by the government of Ghana to the agency She operated in.

CONCLUSION

Taken together, these inconsistencies do not automatically prove innocence. However, they strengthen the defence in one crucial area, reasonable doubt.

In criminal law, especially in complex financial crime cases, prosecutors must present a consistent, coherent, and unambiguous narrative. Once their own witnesses begin:

* validating operational explanations,

* denying knowledge of theft,

* acknowledging authorised procedures,

* disputing financial equivalence claims,

* and confirming routine special operations practices,

From the developments in court, one may argue that the prosecution’s case is built more on suspicion and political optics than airtight criminal proof. And in a criminal trial, that may be enough to secure an acquittal particularly because the

Prosecution has not yet provided any Documentary evidence of the true purpose of the said stolen or diverted GH¢ 49.1 million or $7million, Any letter from the National Security Cordinator confirming that the cyber defense system was not delivered and any Land title documents showing that the accused persons purchased properties in their names

Unless the prosecution can conclusively prove unlawful enrichment and criminal intent beyond reasonable doubt, the court could acquit him.

In the end, it is my believe that, Adu-Boahene may walk free not because the allegations are minor, but because criminal trial require very high evidentiary standards