By Asare Otchere-Darko, Executive Director of DI

The Danquah Institute (DI) has studied the workings of Ghana's political parties since June 1992 and has observed that the decision by political parties to identify a clear leader only two years or one year to general elections does not serve Ghana's democracy well. The Danquah Institute is therefore calling on Ghana's political parties to consider the necessary constitutional amendments which will allow them to choose Presidential Candidates in the first year of a new government, when such parties are in opposition.

We believe Ghana's democracy will be significantly strengthened if presidential candidates, who, effectively, serve as leaders of their respective parties, are elected within the first 12 months after losing the last presidential election. This means political parties and their leaders will have more time to formulate and project policy alternatives between elections than the situation now, which is overly concentrated in directly competing at general elections.

Ghana, with an executive president, has a presidential system as opposed to a parliamentary system of government, which has a prime minister. But, although the President draws more than half of his ministers from Parliament, the leaders of the various parties in parliament are not necessarily the leaders of their respective parties. Also, the defeated presidential candidates cease to 'lead' their parties once elections are over, a leaving a vacuum of domestic peer pressure at the presidency level until the next 'political campaigning season' begins. The consequences of this are worsened by the over-concentration of power in the hands of the Head of State.

As at now, the ruling National Democratic Congress can speak of a clear leader, the President of the Republic. But, the same cannot be said about any of the opposition parties. Even if a political party's constitution says that its National Chairman is the leader or in the absence of a presidential candidate the National Chairman is the leader, the evidence is that the National Chairman does not usually command the kind of leadership clout that a presidential candidate ordinarily does. The reality has always been a lack of clear focus and seeming rudderless-ness whenever an opposition political party has not elected its flag bearer.

Currently, both the National Democratic Congress and the New Patriotic Party constitutions allow their presidential candidates to be selected two years before the next general elections when in opposition. Article 53 (d) of the Convention People's Party Constitution states that "the National Party Congress [to elect the candidate for presidential elections] shall ordinarily be held at least 12 (twelve) months before the holding of Presidential and Parliamentary General Elections in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana."

This means that for at least two years of his or her four-year term, the President of the Republic faces no singular critical voice of 'equal' presidential material stature. This problem becomes more acute when, as has been the situation since 1993, the Executive controls a parliamentary majority. It amounts to at least two years of effective elective dictatorship in Ghana. This, in our view, creates not only a leadership vacuum at the top of the political parties, but also reduces the fullness and effectiveness of the political parties to keep the President and his government in check.

The parliamentary system, as practised in the United Kingdom, Canada, India, etc., allows no ambiguity in leadership in between elections, since a party's leader in the legislature is normally the leader of that party (and, at least, potentially a prime minister). Also, a parliamentary party must always have a recognised individual leader in the legislature, who is readily at hand to put peer pressure on the premier.

Democracy depends on strong institutions. But, it is also true that in order to grow and ensure strong institutions, there must constantly be strong peer pressure on the temporary custodians of power both at the legislative and executive levels.

We made the following observations in our research:

· That, people see a presidential candidate as the leader of the party, regardless of how that party's constitution may define that role and that this reality must be recognised and made to inform the timing for presidential nominations

· that, the closer the period of presidential nomination is to the next presidential election, the more our democracy is about elections and less about what happens in between elections

· that, cohesive party grassroots mobilisation really begins only after a presidential candidate is nominated

· that, without a presidential candidate, political parties seem to lack a clear sense of focus and direction

· that, before a presidential candidate is nominated, party discipline becomes difficult to maintain

· that, before a presidential candidate is nominated, political parties struggle to recruit new members

· that, before a presidential candidate is nominated, political parties with little or no representatives in Parliament virtually fall into long periods of hibernation

· that, before a presidential candidate is nominated, political parties do very little to work on policy initiatives and alternatives

· that, little time is left to spend on formulating policies once a candidate is finally nominated 24 to 12 months before the next presidential election

· that, before a presidential candidate is nominated, political parties struggle to raise funds for party activities and programmes, which is very worrying for the quality of our country's multi-party democracy

· that, without opposition presidential candidates, challenges to the ruling party's policies and conduct are usually disjointed and lack sharpness

· that, without opposition presidential candidates, the President of the Republic is, usually for the first two years, free from any individual critic of 'equal' stature, as it is common under a parliamentary system, where, from day one, the opposition leader regularly faces the prime minister with questions

· that , in the process of consolidating our democracy, 'shadow' presidents may be required to exert 'peer' pressure on the presidency to allow the institution of state to work and be strengthened

· that, the maximum two years, which the political parties' respective constitutions currently allow for presidential nominations before the general elections is woefully inadequate for the effective marketing of a new presidential candidate

· that, viable candidates perform better when they have had several years of prior exposure as presidential candidate

· that, no presidential candidate has won after less than four years exposure as presidential candidate and/or head of state in Ghana's fourth Republic, and

· that, the earlier the presidential nomination process is brought to a close, the greater the opportunity of re-uniting the party.

The Danquah Institute will therefore recommend the following:

· That, when a party is in opposition, its presidential candidate must be nominated not later than 12 months after the last Presidential Election (were it on December 7 or December 28)

· that, the presidential candidate must be able to form his shadow cabinet, which, ideally, must include Members of Parliament

· that, where it is not the case, the political parties must seriously consider the merits and demerits of making a presidential candidate the de jure leader of the party

· That there is a case for maintaining a presidential candidate as leader of the party until a new presidential candidate is chosen.

Contact: gabby@danquahinstitute.org