Opinions of Thursday, 19 November 2026

Columnist: Osman Ali

Ghana's 24-Hour Economy: What is holding back the programme?

Osman Ali is the Executive Director and Managing Partner of Ali-Signani & Associates africa Osman Ali is the Executive Director and Managing Partner of Ali-Signani & Associates africa

My assessment is that these factors are interconnected. However, the most important distinction is between a fundamentally sound economic concept and a policy framework that is not sufficiently prepared, financed and institutionally organized to deliver its intended outcomes.

I would therefore be cautious about concluding that the 24-Hour Economy concept itself was a failure. Rather, the critical question is whether government adequately translated the concept into a fully costed, sequenced, financed and implementable national economic programme.

There are five dimensions worth examining

1. Policy ambition without sufficient implementation architecture

The 24-Hour Economy was intended to transform Ghana from an economy characterized by relatively low production capacity into one in which businesses, industries and institutions could operate in multiple shifts. The original programme identified eight pillars:

. Grow 24
. Make 24
. Build 24
. Show 24
. Connect 24
. Fund 24
. Aspire 24
. Go 24

These pillars covered agriculture, manufacturing, infrastructure, finance, tourism, logistics and human capital. The challenge was translating these broad pillars into specific projects, institutional responsibilities, funding arrangements, timelines and measurable deliverables. For instance:

• Which industries were ready to operate three shifts?
• Which businesses needed additional machinery?
• Which factories had reliable electricity?
• Which markets were available for increased production?
• Which financial institutions would provide affordable working capital?
• Which government institutions would coordinate implementation?

These questions should have been resolved before the programme moved into large-scale implementation. Indeed, the programme's own framework acknowledged structural constraints involving access to finance, infrastructure, logistics, energy and market access.

2. Inadequate enabling infrastructure

This is arguably one of the most important structural weaknesses. A 24-hour economy cannot be achieved merely by asking businesses to operate for 24 hours. It requires an ecosystem that makes continuous production commercially viable. Consider the following:

Enabling requirement What Ghana needed

Electricity Reliable and affordable power, including industrial
power supply

Transport Good roads, efficient freight systems and reliable logistics

Security Adequate security for workers, businesses and goods at night

Water Reliable water supply for industrial and commercial activities

Technology Digital payment systems, automation and connectivity

Labour Skilled workers, shift arrangements and appropriate labour protection

Finance Affordable credit and working capital

Markets Reliable demand for goods and services produced

Sanitation Effective waste management and safe working environments

Imagine a manufacturing company that wants to operate three eight-hour shifts. It must recruit three sets of workers, provide transportation, pay additional security costs, maintain machinery, ensure uninterrupted electricity and secure sufficient orders to justify increased production.

If electricity is unreliable, borrowing costs are high and demand is inadequate, operating three shifts may increase the company's losses rather than its profits. The fundamental economic principle is that businesses will not operate continuously simply because government announces a 24-hour policy.

They will do so when the additional revenue generated exceeds the additional operating costs. This is why energy infrastructure, affordable finance, logistics, security and market access should have been treated as preconditions for implementation rather than complementary interventions.

A government supporter interviewed by the Ghana News Agency in October 2026 also acknowledged the importance of reliable electricity, business incentives and ready markets for the programme's success.

3. Weak financing and inadequate budget integration

This is another critical issue. A programme of this magnitude cannot depend on policy announcements, anticipated private-sector investments or development agreements alone. It requires a credible financing architecture. The programme initially contemplated approximately US$4 billion in investment.

However, questions subsequently arose about the extent to which the proposed financing had actually been mobilized and translated into executable projects. An October 2026 report by Graphic Online, citing programme developments and opposition criticisms, raised questions about the gap between the original financing ambition and actual budgetary provision. These claims should be distinguished from independently audited programme expenditure.

The appropriate financing questions should have included:

1) How much would government contribute?
2) How much would come from private-sector investment?
3) What proportion would be financed through development finance institutions? 4) Which projects would be financed through annual budgetary allocations?
5) Which projects would require guarantees, concessional loans or equity participation?
6) What funding was available for recurrent operational expenditure?

There is also a fundamental public financial management consideration: a policy initiative must find expression in the national budget through properly costed programmes and projects. In October 2026, Professor Godfred Bokpin publicly questioned the programme's costing and implementation structure, arguing that the initiative needed better integration into the national budget and existing ministries.

4. Institutional and implementation weaknesses

The programme also faced an institutional coordination challenge. The establishment of a secretariat was intended to coordinate implementation. However, coordination is not the same as execution.

For example:

• The Ministry of Energy is responsible for energy-sector delivery.
• The Ministry of Food and Agriculture is responsible for agricultural development.
• The Ministry responsible for industry oversees industrial development.
• The Ministry of Roads and Highways is responsible for road infrastructure.
• The Ministry of Finance controls budgetary resource allocation.
• Local government institutions facilitate local infrastructure and development.

A central coordinating institution must ensure that all these agencies work towards common deliverables. Otherwise, the programme risks becoming an additional administrative structure rather than an effective delivery mechanism. An important development was President Mahama's assent to the 24-Hour Economy Authority Bill on 19 February 2026.

The Presidency described the Authority as the central coordinating body for implementation, including alignment of public and private-sector efforts and addressing infrastructure and regulatory needs. The timing raises a legitimate implementation question: was the institutional architecture sufficiently established early enough to support the programme's initial rollout?

5. Insufficient sequencing and prioritization

I consider this particularly important. The government should not have attempted to implement all eight pillars simultaneously. A more practical approach would have been to identify sectors with the greatest immediate potential for increased production and employment. For example:

Phase One: Establish the foundations

• Reliable industrial electricity.
• Affordable production finance.
• Industrial parks and agro-processing infrastructure.
• Labour and regulatory reforms.
• Logistics and market access.

Phase Two: Pilot selected sectors

• Agro-processing.
• Pharmaceuticals.
• Textiles and garments.
. Food storage and distribution.
• Selected manufacturing industries.

Phase Three: Expand successful interventions

• Replicate successful industrial clusters.
• Expand shift-based operations.
• Extend financing and infrastructure support.
• Scale up private-sector participation.

This would have allowed government to test the economic assumptions, identify implementation bottlenecks and correct weaknesses before expanding nationwide. The KPMG/UNDP 2026 PreBudget Survey similarly highlighted concerns among businesses about the programme's practical relevance, financing model and enabling infrastructure.

6. Was the programme hindered by inadequate thought and policy coherence?

This is where the deeper policy question arises. A successful economic transformation programme requires more than identifying sectors for growth. It requires a clear understanding of how the sectors depend on one another. For example, expanding agricultural production without sufficient storage, processing facilities, transport infrastructure and market access could result in increased post-harvest losses.

Similarly, establishing 24-hour markets without ensuring adequate supply chains, electricity, sanitation, security and commercial demand could produce underutilized facilities. This illustrates the importance of policy coherence. A properly integrated policy should establish the relationship between:

• Agricultural production and agro-processing.
• Industrial production and energy supply.
• Production and domestic consumption.
• Export development and logistics.
• Employment and skills development.
• Infrastructure and private-sector investment.
• Financing and commercial viability.

The original programme recognized many of these relationships in its framework. The concern is whether they were translated into adequately coordinated and funded implementation arrangements.

7. Did the emergence of the New Economy programme amount to an admission of failure?

This is an important development as of November 2026. The 2027 Budget, presented on 12 November 2026, introduced the New Economy Programme, with an announced US$10 billion investment over 2027–2030.

It has eight pillars:

1) Macroeconomic stability and affordable finance.
2) Commercial agriculture.
3) Energy infrastructure.
4) Critical minerals value addition.
5) Tourism, culture and creative arts.
6) Textiles and garments.
7) Pharmaceuticals and biomanufacturing.
8) Technology economy.

Government has earmarked GH¢30 billion for the programme in 2027. It has also provided GH¢165 million for the 24-Hour Economy Secretariat. This raises an important question: what is the relationship between the New Economy and the original 24-Hour Economy? The two programmes have considerable thematic overlap.

However, the emergence of the New Economy does not, by itself, establish that the 24-Hour Economy has formally been abandoned or that its implementation failed.

The 2027 Budget still provides funding for the 24-Hour Economy Secretariat. The Minority has characterized the New Economy as a repackaging of the original programme, while government presents it as a broader economic transformation framework.

These are competing political interpretations. The appropriate test is whether the new programme provides a more credible financing, institutional and delivery framework, and whether it accounts for commitments already made under the previous programme.

8. My overall assessment: What were the fundamental weaknesses?

I would distinguish the issues as follows:

Potential weakness Policy significance

Policy incoherence Insufficient alignment between related economic interventions

Inadequate preparation Implementation began before all necessary arrangements were sufficiently established

Weak financing architecture Funding commitments were not clearly translated into executable financing arrangements

Infrastructure deficits Businesses faced constraints to continuous production

Institutional fragmentation Coordination across ministries and agencies was challenging

Poor sequencing Insufficient prioritization of projects and sectors

Weak performance accountability Need for clearer targets, timelines and independently verifiable results

These are not necessarily mutually exclusive explanations. They reinforce one another.

9. What should government have done differently? In my view, the programme needed a comprehensive implementation framework with the following components:

Component Required intervention

Policy framework Clearly defined objectives, scope and measurable outcomes

Economic feasibility Sector-by-sector feasibility studies and commercial viability assessments

Infrastructure Investment in reliable energy, transport, water and industrial facilities

Financing A credible financing and resource mobilization strategy

Institutional arrangements Clear responsibilities for MDAs, MMDAs and the private sector

Legislative reforms Appropriate labour, investment and regulatory reforms

Implementation Phased implementation with defined milestones

Monitoring and evaluation Quarterly reporting on expenditure, outputs, jobs and economic outcomes

Accountability Independent assessment of results and value for money

10. The five questions government should answer before moving forward with the New Economy

These are particularly important from a public financial management and economic planning perspective.

1.Uncompleted commitments: What happened to the original 24-Hour Economy projects, markets, industrial initiatives and other commitments?

2.Financial accountability: How much money was actually committed, released, spent and invested under the original programme, and what outputs were achieved?

3.Infrastructure readiness: Have the energy, transport, logistics, water, security and other enabling infrastructure requirements been adequately addressed

4. Programme continuity: Are existing 24-Hour Economy projects being continued under the New Economy, redesigned, suspended or discontinued?

5. Financing credibility: What proportion of the GH¢30 billion allocated to the New Economy in 2027 is supported by available financing, and what are the funding arrangements for 2028–2030?

These questions are necessary to prevent duplication, abandoned projects, fiscal commitments without adequate funding and repeated policy announcements.

My concluding position I would not attribute the difficulties of the 24-Hour Economy solely to inadequate infrastructure, nor would I conclude that the economic concept was inherently defective.

The more useful distinction is this: Policy formulation is not policy implementation. Policy ambition is not financing. Establishing an institution is not delivering results. And allocating money in a budget is not the same as completing projects.

The 24-Hour Economy required a carefully engineered economic ecosystem in which infrastructure, finance, labour, technology, production, distribution and markets operated together. Where these conditions are absent or inadequately coordinated, the three-shift model becomes commercially difficult to sustain.

The New Economy therefore presents an opportunity to correct the implementation weaknesses, but it should not become a mechanism for avoiding accountability for earlier commitments. One principle should guide the next phase of Ghana's economic transformation: government must demonstrate what it has delivered under existing policies before introducing new policy labels and fresh investment promises. That is the real test of policy coherence, fiscal discipline and publicsector accountability.