Fighting corruption in Sub-Sahara Africa increasingly resembles the classic tale of Don Quixote. Perhaps, like Don Quixote of La Mancha, the anti-corruption industry in Sub-Sahara Africa 'mistakenly perceives windmills for giants.' But who is at fault?

Permit me to quickly illustrate this 'madness.' With what TI calls the corruption perception index, 180 countries and territories are graded and ranked per the perceived levels of public sector corruption, as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys.

"With an average score of 33 out of 100, Sub-Saharan Africa shows no significant improvement on the 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). The gains made by a handful of countries are overshadowed by backsliding or stagnation in others and the region's poor performance. 44 out of 49 countries assessed on the index still score below 50."

Who are these experts, and who are those whose opinions are solicited in this corruption examination? Transparency International's CPI has received several methodological critiques since its inception. But pardon me, and in the meantime, assume that the CPI can measure perceived public sector corruption with a significant appreciable rate of validity and reliability.

I argue that without a contextual understanding of the complex relationship between informal social norms and corruption, the CPI measures corruption levels perceived not by the Sub-Saharan populace but perceived per global anti-corruption norms.

This argument stems from my ethnographic findings from studying informal social norms and corruption in schools in Hanoi-Vietnam, which corroborates several observations from anthropological studies of corruption in Sub-Sahara Africa. I found that the informal social norm and practices in various public and private schools included parents' payment of teachers for extra classes to ensure better school results for their children.

It also included parents' contribution of money towards the provision of equipment in classrooms and showing gratitude and respect to teachers by giving them gifts on five to six occasions per school year. The findings suggested that within the context of the school system, these informal norms functioned as pragmatic responses to the weaknesses in the country's educational system. Consequently, they are widely accepted as normal things to do.

Notwithstanding, some parents and teachers admitted that these informal norms and practices sometimes result in unequal and discriminatory treatment of students whose parents cannot afford to conform to them. Hence, they sometimes become dysfunctional and not necessarily corrupt practices.

It is essential to understand how systemic inefficiencies and challenges within public service delivery result in the upshoot and entrenchment of informalities or informal norms and practices. If the educational system is ineffective, one can only wonder what parents would be willing to do to ensure their wards attain a better education. If teachers are not properly paid and adequately motivated by the government, one could only wonder what lengths they would go to put food on the table for their families.

If unemployment rates are high in the country and paying bribes to some individuals will result in getting a job, one can only wonder how much job seekers are willing to pay or do to gain employment. Like my observations in Vietnam, there is a vicious cycle of systemic malfunctioning within the delivery of public services in Sub-Saharan countries that, to a large extent, requires some informality or informal practices to navigate hardship. That is 'how things are done in the system that prevails.

Consequently, injustices occur when these informalities, informal norms, and practices are outrightly considered as corruption rather than as ways the average person navigates the challenges of the country's public service delivery. First, measurement of corruption like the CPI misrepresents and misconstrues the lived experiences of people who suffer from 'real corruption.

So, if a random Ghanaian is asked if they have paid any monies or done any favours to receive some preferential treatment from public officials in the last year, the answer, whether yes or no, does not indicate perceived corruption per se. The answer could also indicate how such an individual has circumvented the challenges facing the country's public service delivery.

Accordingly, if you compare the CPI of Ghana to that of Norway, you might not be comparing perceived corruption per se but the perceived overall quality of public service delivery.

Those who develop strategies to reduce corruption resulting from the dysfunctional aspects of informal norms and practices must acknowledge these norms as institutionalized social practices that are part of everyday life.

Therefore, anti-corruption interventions must not focus on eradicating these informal social norms, as this might threaten social structures and the average person's socioeconomic survival. Sometimes, corruption is the solution, and the system is the problem.